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Book Review
Avalon Ethics
AMERiCAN LAWYERS AND THEIR CoMMuNrTIs:

ETmcs IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION. By Thomas L.
Shaffert (with Mary M. Shaffer~t). Notre Dame:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1991. Pp. xi, 272.
$24.95.
Reviewed by Thomas D. Eisele
A gentleman-lawyer displays the moral formation he has taken
from his culture. [Sir Thomas] More finally says that what
others have taken for eccentricity [in his refusal to take the
Oath] is the integrity he learned from his persecutors-and
from the common law itself. He also says that his culture's
ability to teach integrity depends on the exercise of integrity by
individuals such as himself, that the statesman who betrays
conscience leads his country by a short route to chaos. More's
direction was political as well as professional, and professional-legal-as well as personal. He was not an autonomous moral hero making lonely choices; the "adamantine sense of self"
that Robert Bolt celebrated in his play about More was cultural
before it was personal. More, like everybody else, had to learn
how to be good.'

t Robert & Marion Short Professor of Law, Notre Dame University; and father of
coauthor, Mary M. Shaffer.
tt A.B., University of Virginia; MA., The Johns Hopkins University; and daughter of
coauthor, Thomas L Shaffer. Mary M. Shaffer, a teacher and student of Italian literature,
now lives in Paris.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Tennessee; B.A., University of Wisconsin,
1970; J.D., Harvard University, 1973; Ph.D. (Philosophy), University of Michigan, 1984.
1 THoMAs L. SHAFFER & MARY M. SHAFFER, AMERICAN LAWYERS AND THEIR COMMUNrr.

ETHICs IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION 83 (1991). All emphases in quotations from this

book given here are emphases in the original.
Mary Shaffer helped to compile and write Chapters Five through Seven, dealing
with Italian-American lawyers and their communities. Nevertheless, since most of my questions and concerns relate to the philosophical or jurisprudential claims made throughout
the book, and since Thomas Shaffer explicitly absolves his daughter from being implicat-
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From whom or from what do we-we humans, we lawyers-learn to be good? And how do we go about learning it? Is
ethical learning, or instruction in morality, different for lawyers
than for lay people? If so, how so? And if not, why not?
These are among the tantalizing questions posed us by American Lawyers and Their Communities, but throughout the course of
the discussion they remain just that, questions: topics of thought,
wonder, and bemused puzzlement. By the end of the book they
have received no final answer. This is an observation, not a criticism. Self-restraint in reaching conclusions is one of the powers of
the book, one of its merits; but it may also be a source of frustration for the book's readers. We so much want "answers" in this
aspect of our lives, especially now, I think; we professionals, we
lawyers, want answers to the unsettling questions in which our professional lives and persona engage us. Yet, this book does not
offer us anything that looks like an answer (although it may well
have suggestions of another kind it wishes to make available to
us).
Having said this, however, I must also register a competing
perception, namely, that the book is written in an assertive fashion, one that is apt to bother, even to disconcert, some readers.
For an author who does not seem to have the answers to our
questions, and who does not seem to want to claim to have them,
this author can sound awfully sure of himself, even authoritarian.
Tom Shaffer is not afraid to speak his mind, to have his say on an
issue.
There is a set of genuine problems here, some of which I
shall discuss in the following pages. For the moment, though, I
want simply to suggest to those who might be offended or put-off
by such a form of authorial address that this is Tom Shaffer's way
of being truthful, being virtuous, and of treating us as he would
wish others to treat him: as a human being capable of speaking
his or her mind truthfully while also capable of hearing the voice
of others whose hearts, minds, and perceptions differ from his.
This rapprochement is not a matter of agreeing to disagree, so
much as it is one of agreeing to try to teach one another, while
also being willing to learn from one another. The hope of eventual agreement sanctions the activity and its effort.

ed in these matters, for the sake of consistency and clarity in this review, I shall speak in
terms of the singular "Shaffer" as author. I in no way intend this stylistic device to demean or deprecate the contribution to this book made by Mary Shaffer.
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Perhaps all of this only goes to say that American Lawyers and
Their Communities is fully prepared to vie with its readers, especially
with their expectations. These materials are both provocative and
disturbing-perhaps it is more accurate to say, provocative because
disturbing. They raise such questions as those posed above and
then address them philosophically, taking them to be matters
deserving such attention and mode of address. I am in agreement
with the task and its aim, convinced as I am that the teaching and
learning of virtue, and the teaching and learning of law, and their
interrelations, are philosophical matters in the best sense. They
repay inquiry and interrogation, even though they rarely supply an
answer or conform to a theory that promises once and for all to
put them in their place. Nevertheless, I am somewhat uncomfortable with certain aspects of the way in which the task and aim
have been carried out; in particular, I wish to discuss Shaffer's way
of making his points (what he calls his "argument") and the juxtaposition in which he leaves these materials.
I. AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL APPROACH TO ETHICS
The argument of the book can be stated in a few words, and
I chose my prefatory quotation as a way of framing that argument:
we all are members of a culture, or various cultures, and we learn
our ethics there, in the culture(s) we inhabit and from which we
come. This seems to mean or imply at least two things about legal
ethics. First, if we are to understand the ethics of the legal profession, we must understand the law and its profession as a culture.
Accordingly, we should investigate the law and its ethics in the
manner in which we humans have learned to investigate any
practice or culture-which is to say, we need to look at them
anthropologically. The second implication or suggestion is that we
must give equal time and attention to the cultures outside of law
to which we lawyers belong and from which we come. The insight
is that, while of course we lawyers do take root within the culture
of the law and its profession, this legal culture is not our only or
exclusive community, it is not our only source of belonging or
membership. Other nonlegal cultures shape and tutor the members of the legal culture as much or more than does the adopted
culture of law. So, the argument goes, we must pay attention to
the societies, locales, and cultures where lawyers come from, where
they have lived and grown before they became lawyers, and where
they continue (or begin) to live and grow while they are lawyers.
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This is an unusual but not unintelligible amalgam. Given the
premise that our ethics or morals can be examined by studying
from whence we come, where we hail as home, it is a small step
to saying that we come from a variety of places or cultures, some
professional and some personal, and only a short leap to realizing
that all such places should be studied as a way of trying to comprehend the ethics or morals we lawyers possess (or, as the case
may be, that we deny). But small steps and short leaps still require
insight to name, and sometimes courage to affirm, and often faith
to make credible; so you will understand when I say that what the
Shaffer father-and-daughter team has achieved here is something
remarkable and well worth doing.
The book has eight chapters which compose four parts. It
begins with an opening chapter ("Legal Ethics After Babel") that
briefly sets out the book's argument. This chapter is followed by
three chapters that characterize the dominant ethic within the
legal profession, which Shaffer calls the ethic of "the gentlemanlawyer"; then three more chapters that characterize a significantly
different ethic, that of Italian-American lawyers; and then a final
chapter ("The Community of the Faithful") that offers one way in
which a lawyer, who discovers himself or herself committed to and
coming from a community outside the law, might use his or her
location, his or her sense of scene and self, to challenge the law
even while remaining faithful to both the law's best ideals and the
outside community's sense of difference from the law.
The beginning chapter states that the aim of the book is not
to study the law of lawyering-as so many books on legal ethics
do 2-- but rather to study the ethical side of lawyering, and to do
so by asking, "Where do lawyers' ethics come from?" Shaffer says
that ethics emanate from our belonging to a community, from our
being members of some group, by means of which we take on the

2 This is not to say that all books on legal ethics merely study the
in fact, my impression is that the trend is currently in favor of studying
much as studying the law in this area. David Luban's recent book is a
of a philosopher trenchantly discussing both the law and the ethics

law of lawyering;
ethics at least as
notable example
of lawyering. See

DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY (1988). In addition, two of the

most recent casebooks in the field have a generous helping of ethical materials in their
selection and discussion of legal ethics. See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & SUSAN P. KONIAK,
THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING (1990); and DEBORAH L. RHODE & DAVID LUBAN,
LEGAL ETHICS (1992), both published by Foundation Press, Inc. But, as a generalization
about books on legal ethics available over the past decade or so, Shaffer's claim is surely
correct.

1992]

AVALON ETHICS

characteristics and characteristic ways of thinking and acting that
any such group will have. In this, Shaffer seems to me to be right,
and valuably so. But he knows that such a claim is controversial
and goes against the grain of the dominant mode of philosophical
discussion in ethics.
Much of what passes for ethical and moral analysis, Shaffer
notes, assumes that we are isolated individuals who are rational
actors and decision-makers, and that we act as ethical or moral
selves only in so far as we prove capable of deliberating our own
actions and calculating our own choices. Generally, this means
that our current language of morality and ethics focuses our attention on "individuals" who are valued-or on their "rights" which
are protected-because they implicate the values of "autonomy"
and "choice." The idea is that true ethical or moral judgment
requires isolating each of us individually from one another, so that
we can compare and assess each of our own individual actions and
judgments without any prejudice to our free choice coming about
by possible influence from others outside the self.
Most of those who labor in legal ethics use the language of
rights and accept the liberal premise that what makes a moral
rule binding is that the moral actor chooses it. If that is so, it
is both legally and ethically necessary to secure the isolation of
the moral actor, so that his choices can be his own and not
somebody else's. Rights provide the isolation .... [This]
means that legal ethics is choice centered, rather than relationship

centered. To use the old words, legal ethics is concerned with
autonomy rather than with character.'
The language of rational choice and rights may or may not
draw our attention to important aspects of our thought and behavior, but it certainly draws our attention away from what must be
equally important about us and our situation: that we exist in a
world where others are constantly, pressingly with us and who are
in fact a part of our "selves," thus constraining and modifying our
sense of self and our willingness or ability to see ourselves as
somehow separate from these others. The best place in which to
appreciate this fact of our lives seems to me to be in the context
of the family. Any family member who does not understand himself or herself as a part of the group, as being fundamentally related to and bound up with his or her parents, siblings, spouse, and

3 SHAFFER& SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 15.
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children (and others more removed), is missing something about
reality, is not getting right something about life in this world of
ours. Similarly, any language that fails to provide us terms in
which to see and speak about such realities fails us too.
We lawyers are able to sit down with our students and talk
about "rights" in the law, but the language of rights is purposely shallow-made to be shallow, so that it can serve a legal
order that claims to be free of values, free of traditions, free of
the horror and charm of human life. The language of rights
does not communicate well when the subject is how to be a
good person.4
Moreover, such a language ignores or denies the fact that the
methods we have for making our choices and deliberations spring
from norms of thought and action made available to us by our
culture and the media it gives us through which to think, act, and
express ourselves. They spring, as well, from the whole person we
are--our character-more than they do from some discrete or
isolatable rational faculty or dispassionate capacity we may possess.
In this sense, our norms for acting and thinking or our ways of
acting and thinking are both cultural inheritances and personal attributes or acquisitions. As Shaffer says about Sir Thomas More,
his act of conscience in refusing to take the Oath "was political as
well as professional, and professional-legal-as well as personal."5
Shaffer suggests we need a language that recognizes the facts
and values that we acquire by living in, and that we gain by working in, the communities to which we belong or from which we
come. This means that, rather than autonomy or choice, our ethical language should recognize and acknowledge the fact that our
actual, everyday conversations tend to be about relationships and
the ties that bind us together. Shaffer also suggests that, rather
than rights, we should be talking about what a good person might
look like to us, or whom we might be willing to say has a good
character, and why we might be willing to claim that attribute for
a specific person. Such discussion and claims would, on Shaffer's
view, be undertaken not so as to construct a model of "the good
person" for every time and place, but rather to help us begin to
clarify the actual criteria we have for ascribing good character to a
person here and now, in this context or situation, in this time and
in this place.

4 Id. at 13.
5 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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Consideration of persons (lives, relationships, cultures) proceeds differently-as I hope I can show. The fundamental difference is anthropological: Deep down, a person is not just a
chooser. There are things about persons (or, as moral philoso-"
phy often says it, moral agents) that are more interesting than
the choices they make, or the sum of all the choices they have
made.
What I am suggesting, of course, is that it is useful in
legal ethics to focus on the good person instead of on the
chooser. Focus on the good person will imply a prominence
for relationships in ethics-putting people back together again,
or, rather, putting people back into ethical theory, noticing
that we people are connected to one another, connected radically (at the roots). Connected organically: We belong; we are
creatures who belong with one another. It is not that we belong because of our choices, but that we make the choices we
do because we are connected to the people we are connected
to. We belong before we make choices; we make the choices
we make because we belong.6
This means, on Shaffer's terms, that we must confute the
liberal emphasis on rights, autonomy, and choice in legal ethics-an emphasis that leads teachers of legal ethics to think and
speak about discrete ethical issues in terms of "problems," "quandaries," and "moral dilemmas." Shaffer wishes, instead, to re-emphasize in our ethics the aspect of moral membership. The ethics
or morals we display in our thoughts, words, and deeds are connected to the fact that we are members of communities and are
also connected to the fact that it is in such communities that we
receive our ethical training and instruction, or in which we form
our moral instincts and intuitions.
Shaffer's type of ethical investigation cannot be carried out
theoretically; it must be done anthropologically, which for Shaffer
means narratively:
we do not know any more about that [i.e., a person's actions
or choices] after we hear his theory than we knew before. If
we want an ethic for that, we have to tell his story, get into his
if and into the lives of people he loved and lost and the lives
of people who loved and lost him.'

6 SHAFFER & SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 16-17, 20-21.
7 Id at 20. See also id. at 66-67.
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This requires anthropological or narrative descriptions of the people and places in which troublesome actions, thoughts, or words
are done, thought, or stated-descriptions that also consider what
these matters may mean there and then. Thus, Shaffer's heavy
reliance on stories is a kind of cultural anthropology, akin to
Clifford Geertz's work.' (Here I .am thinking of Geertz's claim
that his kind of cultural anthropology generates "thick descriptions" of the humans and human structures under study.')
Shaffer reports that he discovered in the classroom this alternative way of looking at and doing legal ethics, because it was in
classroom discussions where he discovered that "students' responses to moral questions [or moral quandaries] indicated no sense of
culture-no sense of where they had come from or of the community they were being prepared for.""0 When they were pushed
to respond further to ethical concerns, Shaffer says that his students would eventually take a stand on who they were, which
meant, they would tell him where they came from. Shaffer then
realized that "[p]eople show what their morals are by claiming
where they come from ....

[P]eople tend to explain their morals

by claiming membership in a community-a family, an ethnic
group, a region of the country, or... a congregation. We account for our morals-unintentionally-by naming what we belong
11
to."
Both the inquiry (which in an ethics class would have been
stated as a quandary) and the moral explanation relate to a
"we-feeling," a feeling th[at a] person gets when he looks to
the left and to the right and says to himself, "I am one of
these. When I speak of this people, I can say 'we.'" It is not
that he belongs because he made .the right choice, but that he
is right because he belongs.
Influences ...

are at work here, whether we see them or

not. They are prior, in time and in potency, to quandaries,
choices, rules, principles; they are prior to deductive reasoning,
12
or logic, or scripture, or threat. Belonging explains reality.

8

See,

e.g., CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE (1983); CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE

INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES (1973).
9 CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 6-10 (1973).
10 SHAFFER & SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 24.
11 Id. at 25.

12

Id. at 27-28.
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II.

CONFRONTING SHAFFER'S STYLE

I could continue to describe the rest of the book, noting the
details of its remaining three parts: Shaffer's finding that the law
incorporates or expresses a "gentleman's" ethic; both co-authors
describing a quite different ethic, an "immigrant" ethic common
to Italian-American lawyers; and the last chapter discussing the
"community of the faithful," in which Shaffer suggests that a lawyer who finds himself or herself committed to a religious tradition
or community might bring that religious commitment to bear on
the "idols" of the law. But this seems to me to be less useful than
trying to engage with Shaffer on his own terms and questioning
some of his characteristic moves and gestures that a reader confronts throughout this book. I group my questions under the alliterative categories of assertion, allusion, and argument.
A.

Assertion.

Begin with the closing remark in the immediately preceding
quotation fron the book, where Shaffer says, "Belonging explains
reality.""3 This states one of Shaffer's fundamental commitments
in this book and, as such, perhaps" we should not expect any argument for its truth or falsity. Still, I find it difficult to credit the
claim that belonging "explains reality," and I wonder what I am
supposed to do with such a remark. What does Shaffer expect of
me as a reader? How does he expect me to take this assertion? Is
its truth, its acceptability, supposed to be patently clear? If it is, I
can only respond by saying that its truth is not patently clear to
me.
I would concur in the view that the experience of "belonging"
is fundamental to human beings and, in this sense, is also basic to
the reality of which we are a part. But to say this is only to say
that belonging is a basic ingredient in human experience; this fact
in no way warrants the further assertion that belonging thereby
somehow "explains" (all of) reality. In the context in which this
remark is made, I do not understand Shaffer to be inviting me to
consider, to weigh and evaluate, the truth or falsity of his claim;
his remark does not seem to me to be an invitation to thought
and exploration. Rather, Shaffer's assertion strikes me as

13

See text accompanying note 12.
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something that I am supposed to agree with or accept uncritically,
to take on faith or credit, to swallow. And in this context, I find
that I cannot--or that I do not want to--do that. I get my back
up at the suggestion that I should.
This is a delicate matter, and I do not want to make too
much of it; still, as I mentioned earlier, I think this writing will
frustrate at least some of its readers, in part because of the kind
of considerations that I am now trying to articulate. The tone of
Shaffer's remark in this context is conclusory and seems to me to
be meant to close a thought, to nail down an argument. But bare
assertion rarely concludes an argument (and it certainly should
not in philosophy). Assertion more likely initiates an argument-and often not the one that the assertive author wishes to
initiate with the reader. My guess is that we readers are meant at
this point in Shaffer's text to see what he sees and thus to experience a kind of epiphany; that is the tone that I take him to be
adopting here. I find, however, that I cannot accede to it, cannot
accept it as a gesture with which I am comfortable or toward
which I am receptive.
Shaffer himself seems to me to acknowledge that at least part
of the time the assertiveness of his writing bothers him too, and
he sometimes even seems to chafe at the difficulties his prose
presents. I have in mind, for example, his fine aside, a remarkable
piece of self-insight, in a footnote appended to his unpacking of
the gentleman's ethic in the legal profession. There Shaffer allows
that his words may be more forceful and more affirmative than,
ultimately, he wishes to be in relation to the ethic he is describing. He nonetheless suggests that, for the moment, he must be
allowed to have his say in this particular voice:
I must ask [the reader] to forgive me for seeming credulous in
the affection with which I introduced the subject [of the

gentleman's ethic] in the last chapter, and with which I will
proceed to account for it in this chapter and the next. Credulity is the way my poor mind works: Liberal education is said to
create skepticism, and I occasionally notice that effect in my
children and my students, but forty years of it have not made

my mind work that way. I need to buy whatever is being sold
before I can begin to think critically about it-and I will get
around to criticism. 4

14

SHAFFER & SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 50 n.2.
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Any person who can see so clearly and dispassionately a part
of himself, his own ways, in the work he has produced, deserves to
be honored, not scolded. Then perhaps what a reader must do in
the face of such self-acknowledgment is to hold the author to his
promise (to get around to criticism) and vie with the author
whenever his remarks seem unfairly assertive or suspiciously "selfevident." I suspect that it is Shaffer's need "to buy whatever is being sold before . . . [he is able] to think critically about it" that
lends a certain assertive quality to his remarks. He seems to be
endorsing a view when in fact he may only be describing it; the
vividness or vivacity of his description reads for us as though it
were a kind of endorsement. Since I think that we need such'
matters to be revived, or revivified, I also believe that we must
tolerate some of the assertive energy that accomplishes that aim.
But then we also must assess it, weigh it, to see if and when it is
adequate, and if and when excessive. This may be the best we can
do and, in any event, it seems to be the fair thing to do.
B. Allusion.
In saying, as I did before,"5 that Shaffer's assertion about
belonging explaining reality is probably intended to evoke in us
an epiphany, a kind of insight or intuition, I am trying to record
not only something about the assertiveness of his writing, but also
something about its allusiveness. He wants us to see certain things,
certain possibilities-new connections, new relations, new juxtapositions-in the materials, actions, and media of our lives, things we
heretofore have not seen there and then: Opportunities ignored,
roads not taken. To do this, we must see and say what he sees
and says there and then. Do we?
In the extensive notes to this book, Shaffer at one point refers to his "anthropological argument-that we get our morals
from our culture,"16 and then goes on to say that his argument,
as with "[a]ny interesting communitarian argument[,] rests to a
certain extent on intuition, which is easier for a poet than for a
professor, and on . . . a 'master story.'"'" In view of the humble
truth that what he is trying to do here is difficult--doubly so in
this, the genre of professorial, assertive writing which must forgo

15

&e supra text following note 13.

16 SHAFFER & SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 222.
17 Id.
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both the tools and the forms of poetic writing-I think that
Shaffer's writing is allusive in the best sense. It works by drawing
together many different strands of meaning, suggestion, and implication, and it also draws upon many different materials (legal
works, philosophical texts, literary pieces, theological writings, and
other works of art, such as movies). Shaffer's allusive writing is
powerful, powerfully integrative in its ability to make our disparate
world whole again.
But in any such writing, the danger is that the reader simply
will not know the works being alluded to (which says more about
our impoverishment than it does anything about Shaffer's writing),
or that the reader simply will not be able to follow Shaffer's allusions. We readers may not see what he sees. This is not a minor
or tangential matter, as Shaffer recognizes. Being able to see what
is what, and being able to say what is what, are moral acts and
arts. "Seeing is a moral art.""8 If this is so (and I am inclined to
think it is), then whether we readers see the connections that
Shaffer sees is a fundamental issue posed by this book, something
to be confronted, not avoided or excused.
The allusiveness in his writing, however, also presents another
reason why I think that some readers are apt to find this writing
frustrating. The book glances at connections, states themes, and
mentions morals of stories without always following them out as
systematically or as methodically as I would like. Perhaps this
merely says that in my pedantry I am failing to keep up with the
poetry of Shaffer's writing. Fair enough; it will not be the first
time that I have failed in this regard.
C. Argument.
I said at the beginning of this Review that this book is written
in a way so as not to offer us answers (which denial of the existence of answers to such questions as are posed, we may find
frustrating). Yet, the book also is written, as I have said, in a way
that often seems to be assertive, as though the author knew the
answers but simply was not about to bother to elaborate on them
(which refusal to provide the answers he has to such questions as
are posed, we also may find frustrating). This tension, or paradox,
illustrates the problematic nature of Shaffer's writing. So far, I

18 id. at 38. &e also id. at 166, 167, and 233 ("a matter of seeing and saying as
moral arts").
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have suggested that it is assertive and allusive in ways that risk
incomprehension, if not outright dismissal. My aim is not to adduce grounds for its dismissal, but rather to caution this book's
readers against any too hasty rejection of the book. It has its several difficulties, but also its rewards.
There is a third and final aspect of Shaffer's writing that I
need to register: Tom Shaffer has a quite generous notion of what
constitutes argument. For anyone who is trained in philosophical
argument, much of what he says may seem too assertive and ungrounded, or too loose and allusive, and perhaps even too hyperbolic, to fit that which contemporary Anglo-American philosophy
calls "argument." This does not mean that what Shaffer says can
therefore be ruled out, as though his writing must fit some paradigm of philosophical writing or else be considered ineffectual.
What it does mean, however, is that the diverse readers who are
apt to read this book must realize that they bring a varied set of
backgrounds and expectations to the book, and Shaffer is trying to
speak to all of them. This is a daunting goal, one not easily accomplished. I think we need to afford Shaffer the freedom to
make his case (to put it in legalistic terms, without trying to be
pejorative), while at the same time seeing to it that he does not
have carte blanche. Not just anything goes.
As a way of illustrating this last point, let me once more study
Shaffer's claim, "Belonging explains reality."19 My hesitancy to
endorse or embrace this remark has to do at least in part with its
hyperbole. "Belonging" "explains" "reality"? Those three words are
hard words to grasp, difficult to put together in the way in which
Shaffer puts them together. Also, they are significant words, expressing important values and connections in our world and our
culture, in our community. I cannot simply string these three
words together in the way in which Shaffer does and rest content
in doing so. The claim these words in this order make seems to
me to so outstretch anything I could claim to know or to imagine,
that I simply do not feel confident (as Shaffer seems to feel) either in asserting them or in accepting them as asserted.
Philosophy so often works in hyperbole, in exaggerated claims
to know, in hyperbolic notions of explanation and comprehension
of reality, that it is incumbent upon us to see hyperbole for what
it is in this field: an occupational hazard, a constant and continu-

19

See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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ing temptation. Accordingly, it is something against which we must
guard ourselves and our words when we are engaged in any kind
of philosophizing.' I am fully willing to grant Shaffer his notion
that the cultures and communities to which we belong as persons
or as professionals are fundamental to understanding our subsequent actions, thoughts, and words. It is one of the achievements
of this book that Shaffer shows so well that such a claim has to be
taken into account if we are to reach any satisfying understanding
of lawyers and their ethics. But then I also want us to recognize
that belonging is not everything and that it cannot explain everything; it is simply one more piece in the mosaic that our lives
comprise. (It may be a larger piece than I allow or a smaller piece
than Shaffer suggests; then the point must be to get on with trying to understand and place it better in our overall understanding
of our lives and our world.)
Philosophers, or for that matter any writer, cannot guard
themselves, their claims and assertions, all of the time; they cannot
everywhere hedge their words. I do not suppose that we would
want them to do so even if they could-such writing would be
irredeemably dull. Under such conditions, our reading must become an act of assessing the claims and assertions made, an act in
which the author and the reader vie with one another over what
can and cannot be comfortably or conscientiously said or suggested in any given line, paragraph, or context. For my part in this
process, I am saying that Shaffer's remark about belonging and
reality leaves me uncomfortable in a place where I do not find the
discomfort of the remark justifiable. But there are times and places when such a remark might not bother me.
III.

SHAFFER'S JUXTAPOSITION OF TWO ETHICS

The bulk of this book is devoted to a development of two
contrasting ethics, the traditional ethic of the gentlemanawyer,
and the nontraditional ethic of certain Italian-American lawyers. So
far, I have done very little with this material, and nothing in this
Review will amount to a considered discussion of that material.

20 That philosophy is a constant battle, among ourselves and within each self, to
give expression to our temptations but not to give them our credence, is a lesson I can
say that I have learned from the later writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein and the work of
Stanley Cavell. For those wishing to learn more about these matters, I would point to
two books for beginning one's studies: LUDWIG WrTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 3d ed. 1968); and STANLEY CAVELL, MUST WE MEAN
WHAT WE SAP (1969).
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There are limits to what I can do. But I do wish to suggest one
way in which the body of the book, which juxtaposes three chapters on the gentleman-lawyer's ethic with three chapters on the
Italian-American immigrant's ethic, leaves me wondering what is
intended by this juxtaposition.
When Shaffer turns his attention directly to the ethics of
lawyers, he finds that the legal profession continues to rely upon a
traditional ethic of the gentleman-lawyer.
The morals of the gentleman are an ethic for the professions.
Television preserves for us an old and still prevalent way to be
a lawyer (or a physician) and a good person: Be a gentleman.
The gentleman's ethic is described in our stories, even our
most popular and most trendy stories, which is to say that,
whatever21the gentleman's ethic is, we have not managed to get
rid of it.
The result is that we find the ethic of the gentleman everywhere
in Anglo-American culture; it is something that we all share as an
ethical inheritance. "[T]he gentleman is the most vivid and the
most enduring figure in American professional ethics ....
The
morals of the gentleman are the American lawyer's unavoidable
ethical inheritance ....
We cannot abolish the gentleman's ethic
from the professions; we could more easily abolish our grandparents."'
The value of Shaffer's insight is that he is forcing us to see
something about ourselves that we would like to believe is not
true; we would like to think that we are beyond it, that we have
grown past it. In this day and age in our culture, we so much
want to deny that the ethics of the gentleman may still inhabit
and in fact direct our professional, legal ethics. Such an insight is
especially threatening to our shared, cultural wish for egalitarianism. But Shaffer thinks that we must confront this fact of our legal
and ethical inheritance, not deny it, for he believes that we can
still live with and work within this ethic of the gentleman.
It may be that the gentleman's morality, with its elitism a thing
as old as Aristotle's ethics, can be described carefully enough
so that its persistence in the legal profession will be useful and
not merely inevitable."
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SHAFFER & SHAFFER, supra note l, at 34.
Id at 51, 52.
Id. at 52-53.
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In fact, far from being a liability, Shaffer finds the ethic of
the gentleman to be an asset, one of the hidden strengths of our
inherited cultural ethic, if we only can learn to see how we might
work within the ethic to empower ourselves. "Scholars in moral
philosophy and theology have, I think, too quickly come to ignore
24
or reject the notion that the gentleman is an ethical argument."
Shaffer's claim is that, contrary to this scholarly neglect or rejection, if we look closely and carefully at the attributes of the gentleman, we shall find that they roughly track, mutatis mutandis, the
attributes of the Aristotelian "man of practical wisdom," or the
"Athenian gentleman."25 To this extent, then, we shall discover
that these attributes form a more coherent picture of a good
person, or a good character, than we might otherwise imagine. (I
think that Shaffer makes his case on this point. In a series of
vignettes and analyses, he Very usefully describes some of the contemporary attributes he understands a "gentleman" to have in our
Anglo-American culture. The list includes civility, self-possession,
discrimination, and diffidence. 2 )
But Shaffer does not accept the gentleman's ethic entirely. He
finds it useful as a resource, but also fallible as a guide to our
actions or our characters. In particular, he finds fault with it as an
ethic to the extent that it "does not know how to account for the
suffering of others."2 7 The claim is that gentlemen-lawyers tend to
deny the suffering of others, because they are uncomfortable with
it; or else they deny the inevitability of the suffering of others.
That is, they deny that it is inevitable that they themselves, gentlemen-lawyers, cannot do anything to change the suffering of others,
and that morality has its costs and consequences, including
causing others to suffer.
Shaffer concludes that:
the gentleman's ethic .

.

. contains within itself both the cul-

tural endurance and the coherence to come to terms with the
objections that it is elitist, racist, and sexist; that it is in complicity with the abuses of power; that it is unable to endure
tragedy; and that it is not able to understand that the gentleman must suffer for his goodness. But I [that is, Shaffer] can-
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Id. at 38.
Id. at 38-39.

26 See id. at 43-46.
27 I at 87.
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not locate a way to say that the ethic of the gentleman-lawyer
comes to terms with the suffering that the moral life brings to
others.

28

It is on this note that Shaffer turns (with the help of his
daughter) to another culture, that of Italian-American lawyers who
have managed to maintain their attachment to their immigrant
culture even while they became members of the legal profession.
Shaffer sees this as a useful image of the kind of balance, of the
Aristotelian mean, that we need to achieve. The idea is not to
assimilate one culture to the other, but rather to preserve the two
cultures in balance, in a mutually respectful relation.
We suggest that such a figure [i.e., a lawyer trying to bridge
two cultures] has two ways of using legal power to deal between cultures-ways that are different in their 'effect on both
cultures. One way is to conform the other culture to the
gentleman's culture: That is the way of assimilation. The other
way is to protect the other culture and, as the lawyer manages
to locate openings in the law and politics of the time, to manipulate the gentleman's culture into coming to terms with it.
29
That is the way of preseroation.
In describing how this feat has been achieved by a variety of Italian-American lawyers, the Shaffers concentrate on the Italian virtue
of rispetto (said to be untranslatable').
Our understanding of rispetto is that it is a good habit, through
which the person learns, practices, teaches, and remembers her
membership in the family ....

The practice of this virtue is

what allows a modem American lawyer to be in and of her
civic and professional community without loss either of dignity
or of her sense of self."1
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Id.
I.
See
Id.

at 94-95.
at 107.
id. at 135 n.6.
at 135-36. The Shaffers further describe rispetto, stating:

Rispetto was a way for each member of the family to be formed both in
the ability to be in the family and in the ability to be in the family without loss
of self. Such a formation [of the self] makes it possible to be in other associations, and to be present there as the family (even when one goes there alone),
in an effective, realistic way, without loss of self, self-respect, or respect for the
family.
Id. at 140.
For additional comments on and developments of this central concept in the book,
see id. at 166, 175, 178, 182, 194.
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All of this argument is consistent with what I take to be
Shaffer's main point, which amounts to the following:
No one is born a lawyer. Those who come to American law
schools come with a moral order that is ignored or explicated,
challenged or supported, as part of their legal education and
of their apprenticeship in the American legal profession. Their
moral order affects the way they look at the law; it determines
their jurisprudence. It determines as well the way they look at
their clients, their colleagues in the practice, and the opponents of their clients. The moral order a person brings to the
the quesprofession determines whether she even thinks5 about
2
tion of how to be a good person and a lawyer.
I do not quarrel with the Shaffers' impressive gathering of
materials to support their reading of Italian-American ethics, or
with Tom Shaffer's careful and innovative reconstruction of the
virtues and vices embedded in the gentleman-lawyer's ethic. I do
wonder what it all comes to, however, what it means for us and
our understanding of our ethics (professionally or personally). Just
what are the implications of what Shaffer claims about lawyers and
their ethics, lawyers and their communities? If what Shaffer says
about our legal ethics is true, then we still do not know where this
puts us, either as lawyers or as human beings.
There are at least two aspects of his argument which bother
me. These aspects are related to one another, but I shall try to
discuss them one at a time. First, while Shaffer emphasizes that
the virtues of an ethic are learned in the process of personal formation and not in any didactic teaching of the ethic, he also
wants to say that we can gain entry to, or an understanding of, a
foreign culture in which we have not been formed or trained.
How is this possible? Secondly, while he denigrates the importance
of the ethics of choice (or autonomy), it seems to me that our
ability to make sense out of any culture or ethic (foreign or domestic), and our ability to make use of it, will implicate those very
values of reasoning, criticism, choice, and autonomy that Shaffer
dismisses.
As to the first aspect, Shaffer often remarks that we humans
are born into an ethic and take it on as our own not as a matter
of choice or any kind of ratiocination, but rather as a kind of
inheritance or formation of the self. We gain it because we belong
to it. While one's cultural inheritance may look or sound nothing

32

Id. at 127.
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like formal instruction in moral reasoning or ethical argumentation, I question what the proposed dichotomy really shows. After
all, the Shaffers make a great deal of use of the Italian-American
virtue of rispetto, and yet I do not know that either of them was
reared or formed in that ethic. What enables them to adopt and
incorporate the virtues of an Italian-American ethic? It is, I suppose, the kind of study, data collection, and critical thinking that
Chapters Five through Seven evidence in this book. This very
fact-that the Shaffers can do what they did-suggests that we too
can learn about another ethic without belonging to it, and can
learn enough about it to use its virtues in our own lives and doings. I do not see that the Shaffers ever account for this fact, or
that they can account for it, given their overemphasis (as I see it)
on the need to belong to an ethic in order to absorb or possess
its insights and values. Surely, formation in an ethic by being a
member, by belonging to it, is sufficient; but is it necessary? I
doubt it. The Shaffers' implicit suggestion behind the juxtaposition
of the gentleman-lawyer's ethic and the Italian-American ethik-namely, that we lawyers would do well to adopt the practice of
7ispetto and carry it over to our practice of law-is not a coherent
criticism of the way we currently act and think as lawyers, unless
some appropriation of a foreign ethic is possible short of actually
belonging to it.
Perhaps it is inappropriate to expect any further response to
this issue from this particular book; after all, simply raising the
issue is sufficiently valuable and difficult at this time. Then I respectfully ask for further guidance in the future on this point:
How is it that we can seem to learn or appropriate an ethic of
which we are not members without our misconceiving or misinterpreting that ethic? If it is true that we can do this usefully, then I
wonder about the emphasis that being a member of an ethic receives in this book. Is the emphasis necessary, or correct?
This question leads me to the second troublesome aspect of
Shaffer's argument. In discussing the lesson of Sir Thomas More,
Shaffer makes the following claim:
But this [moral] formation is not radically individual; that is
what was behind More's point about the statesman's conscience: No one becomes virtuous alone. We learn in the community what virtue is and how to practice it: We learn as we
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are part of the community.33
Yes, we learn from the community into which we are born and
from the communities into which we are received or initiated
(such as the legal profession). But we also remake those communities and reshape them, either by pursuing further or by rejecting
some of the possibilities that those communities offer us for acceptance. I certainly would not want to contend that communal acceptance and rejection, cultural pursuit and divergence, are solely
matters of ratiocination or calculated choices. At the same time,
however, it is not clear to me that choice, reasoning, and criticism
(of one's self, of what one has become in this culture, or of what
one threatens to become in it; and of one's culture, what it has
become or what it threatens to become) are therefore irrelevant
to these processes of acceptance and rejection, pursuit and divergence. I do not see how they can be irrelevant, even though I
cannot offer an account of how they operate in the process of our
moral education. Yet, some of what Shaffer says about choice, autonomy, and reasoning in morals seems to me to deny them any
place or function in these matters. I think that this is a mistake,
or a misemphasis, that bears correction.
Here is one way in which I find this emphasis to be off the
mark. As Shaffer reaches the conclusion of the section devoted to
a description and discussion of the gentleman-lawyer's ethic, he
says:
But we do not choose our morals; the best we can hope to do
is to describe them, as we describe ourselves ....
You cannot
select a professional ethic as you would decide on a husband
or a place to live or a church to go to. A professional ethic is
s4
mostly something you have.
This remark strikes me as being both true and untrue. We do
begin our lives being born into a family and a community-even,
a series of communities: ethnic, religious, political, social, economic, and the like-and we are formed by the communities of which
we are a part. Just as surely, however, at least in Western culture,
we come to think of ourselves as separate individuals, people who
have a life and an existence separate and apart from the life and
existence we have as a member of these groups. The recognition
or realization of individuality may come afterward, may be later in
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Id. at 84.
Id. at 96.
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the sequence of our experience, but that fact alone does not
mean that this later aspect of our experience is therefore secondary in importance to the prior experience of belonging, of being a
member of a group. Truly, just as Shaffer claims, we do not initially "choose our morals"; but this alone does not mean that we
therefore never can choose our morals or that the element of
choice in our ethics or morals is a minor one.
I earlier quoted Shaffer as saying, "We belong before we make
choices; we make the choices we make because we belong." 5 I
think that, generally speaking, the first clause in this quotation is
true, but the truth or falsity of the second clause depends too
much on specifics to be generalizable. We may or may not make
the choices we make because we belong: the "whys" and the
"wherefores" of such a claim are too dense and difficult to be susceptible to an easy generalization.
In this regard, it also is useful to recall the quotation with
which this Review opens,' where Shaffer uses the example of Sir
Thomas More. He says that "what others have taken for eccentricity [in More's refusal to take the Oath] is the integrity he
learned from his persecutors-and from the common law itself." 7 This is a claim not about the ethics or morality into
which More was born, but rather about the ethics or morality into
which More became initiated or acculturated when he became a
common-law lawyer. It would appear to me that More's case shows
exactly that sometimes we can and do "choose our morals," at least
in the sense in which More worked out a moral conception of
himself as lawyer, as religious believer, and as loyal subject of the
king-a conception that he for one found capable of assent. Perhaps this is not exactly a case of choosing one's morals, at least
not in the same sense in which one might choose roast beef or
chicken for dinner or might choose between playing cards or
chess for entertainment. Yet, More's case illustrates, I think, an
element of choice-among-competing-moral-orders that I find contrary to Shaffer's suggested view. More found a way to choose between the morals of the ordinary English person of his time and
the morals of his professional, common-law ethic. He also found a
way to choose between the competing morals of the professional
ethic of the courtiers or politicians of his time (including some of

35 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
36 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
37 SHAFFER & SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 83.
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the English clergy) and the morals of More's learned, adopted
ethic of the professional common-law lawyer. I do not say that this
is all there is to More's story, or that this sense of moral choice is
an easy matter to isolate in these facts or about which to speak in
this case; but I do say that Shaffer's emphasis on choice-depending-upon-belonging seems to me to leave the full story untold, or
underdeveloped.
I believe Shaffer's argument in response to my criticism would
refer me to his distinction between a "first moral order" and a
"second moral order."' I do not myself happen to find that distinction helpful, in part because I think it falsely portrays the
nature of ethical learning, criticism, and communication. This
distinction claims that critical self-reflection is not an integral part
of one's moral inheritance, but rather that such critical self-possession transforms a "first moral order" into a "second moral order," transforming something intuitively lived, as it were, into
something didactically learned. For my part, however, I believe
that both the need for self-reflection and criticism of one's inherited moral tradition or ethic, and the means of achieving them,
come with the initial inheritance; they are a part of the culture one
inherits. In fact, I think that we are instructed in this need and
these means by the very ethic or tradition we inherit. How the
ethic or tradition does this, I am not at all sure I can say; but that
it does this, I am willing to claim. 9
This issue is particularly important to address in view of the
fact that many writers and thinkers in professional ethics see "virtue ethics" or "character ethics" of the kind that Shaffer pursues
here to be a deadend, even an irrelevancy. For example, in a new
casebook, Legal Ethics, Deborah Rhode and David Luban argue:
To focus on virtue in legal ethics means to turn attention away
from the nature of particular actions and their consequences
and to focus instead on the character of the lawyers who perform these actions .... Yet to critics, this approach yields no

38 See id. at 127-30.
39 It seems to me that the collection of stories from Italian-American lawyers supports my point here. In at least two of the stories collected by the Shaffers, we are told
that the person speaking eventually discovered that he or she had to recognize that, for
all of the love and concern he or she had received in an Italian-American family, one
also had at some point to break free of the family and to realize or to establish one's
distance from the family. See,e.g., id. at 166, 186. This kind of individual choice is taught
a member of the culture or ethic by that very same culture or ethic. How does such
teaching take place?
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more determinate conclusions than other frameworks. As subsequent discussion will note, the central question for legal ethics
is often what the good lawyer should do under circumstances
of moral complexity or competing values. An approach that
focuses on character as a unitary concept may not be helpful
the demands of particular roles under such cirin addressing
4
cumstances. 0
Shaffer and others could respond in a variety of ways to this
criticism, including questioning the apparent request for "more
determinate conclusions" and denying the charge of relying upon
"a unitary concept" of character. But the gist of the complaint will
not go away, regardless of these defensive measures, and I think
that all those working in this area (among whom I number myself) need to think long and hard about the implications of our
claims concerning "virtue ethics" for our understanding of the
morality of human actions and decisions. I may agree with Shaffer
that rational choice and autonomy are overemphasized by the
traditional writers in the area of professional ethics (as well as in
other philosophical fields); but this does not mean that such topics and matters can be dismissed. Choices, even tragic choices,
cannot be denied as a part of our experience and our lives. 41 In
particular, two matters of ethical choice or growth must be studied: (1) How do we come to accept some elements of an ethic,
and yet not its other elements? Are we able to develop the
strengths of an ethic without also being simultaneously hobbled by
its weaknesses? (2) When two ethics conflict (as, for example,
where Shaffer says the professional ethic of the gentleman-lawyer
conflicts with the immigrant ethic of Italian-Americans), how are
we able to choose between the varying visions and virtues offered
us by those conflicting ethics? Or does choice have nothing to do

with it?
IV. NARRATIVES AND CRITICISM: COMPREHENDING CULTURAL
CONTRADICTIONS

American Lawtyers and Their Communities is a thoroughly original
book, and deserves to be honored as such. All the same, it derives
some of its points of departure and some of its critical terms and
arguments from a renewal of interest in "virtue ethics" or "charac-
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RHODE & LuBAN, supra note 2, at 10.
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ter ethics." Shaffer's book is, then, a contribution to an ongoing
debate or conversation. The premier book in this renewed discussion is Alasdair MacIntyre's After Virtue.4 2 In that book, MacIntyre
argues that moral philosophy has lost its way in failing to follow or
develop the Aristotelian tradition, and MacIntyre tries to show in a
preliminary way how that moral tradition might be recovered and
resuscitated in the late twentieth century. MacIntyre's later book,
Whose Justice? Which Rationality?,' goes further in developing the
promises and projected claims of the earlier book in terms of
rescuing the Aristotelian tradition for contemporary life. Shaffer,
in his appeal to the Aristotelian tradition and in his use of narratives to develop and understand the ethics of the gentleman-lawyer
and of the immigrant Italian-Americans, is proceeding in the direction first sketched and surveyed by MacIntyre (after Aristotle).
At the same time, Shaffer is continuing work done by Robert
Bellah and others on the crisis of commitment in American life
and the deterioration of our sense of community (most notably
reported in the best-selling book, Habits of the Heart"), and work
done by Stanley Hauerwas on the recovery of Christian virtue and
vision through the study of narratives. 45 Finally, Shaffer also is
responding to and furthering feminist writing concerned with radical criticism of the ontological and ethical assumptions and the
models of human experience put forth by liberalism-feminist
writing that, in particular, importantly depends upon women finding their own voices and telling their own stories.' This is a vast
canvass on which to be working, and a complex one too. Here, I
want to consider only one aspect of this complicated genealogy in
Shaffer's project.
What Shaffer says and what he shows in this book cannot be
said and shown except through the use of stories. It is only
through the narrative collection and collocation of descriptions of
how we lawyers, we immigrants, or we believers think and feel and
speak and act that we shall come to understand who we are and
what our ethics or morals truly are. This is the faith of this book,

ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (2d ed. 1984).
43 ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? (1988).
44 ROBERT N. BEUAH ET A.., HABITS OF THE HEART (1985).
45 See, e.g., STANLEY HAUERWAS, THE PEACEABLE KINGDOM (1983); STANLEY HAUERWAS,
VISION AND VIRTUE (1974).
46 From a vast literature, I would for this purpose call attention to two works: CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982); and Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55
U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1988).
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one of its central tenets, and the book cannot work on the reader
if the reader does not grant Shaffer this fundamental premise, at
least as a working hypothesis. Although it may seem (by the foregoing criticisms) that I do not grant Shaffer this courtesy, I hope
that I can truthfully say that I do, and that I have tried to participate in the spirit and the mode in which he approaches these
matters. I do because, in part, I agree with Shaffer, MacIntyre, and
Bellah (and others) whose work shows that, if we are concerned
with an integrated and complete whole-say, an ethic, a tradition,
a society, a community, or a person-then we must try to understand that whole in its integrity and completeness. "Being concerned with the whole does not mean a mere adding together of
facts from the various specialized disciplines. Such facts become
relevant only when interpreted in terms of a frame of reference
that can encompass them and give form and shape to a conception of the whole." 7 Narratives or stories are one way human
beings have found to provide a frame of reference and to give
form and shape to their experience and to the matters that most
interest and implicate them. "Narrative is a primary and powerful
way by which to know about a whole. In an important sense, what
a society (or a person) is, is its history.' 8 Yet, having said this, I
find that I also want to say: Stories are not enough.
In studying a culture, a community, or an integrated ethic, we
are studying a whole. In learning it from the inside or the outside,
in belonging to 'it or distancing ourselves from it, we are (I believe) always asking ourselves, "Where does this fit the pattern of
the whole? What does not fit? What can I accept? What must I
reject?" (And so on.) We are able to do this because, as Lionel
Trilling said:
A culture is not a flow, nor even a confluence; the form of its
existence is struggle, or at least debate-it is nothing if not a
dialectic. And in any culture there are likely to be certain artists who contain a large part of the dialectic within themselves,
their meaning and power lying in their contradictions; they
contain within themselves, it may be said, the very essence of
the culture, and the sign of this is that they do not submit to
serve the ends of any one ideological group or tendency.49

47 BELLAH Er
48 Id. at 302.

AL, supira note 44, at 300.

49 LIONEL TRILLING, THE LIBERAL IMAGINATION 9 (1950).
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Narratives are powerful and important because they can encompass and express these cultural contradictions in a way that theories or abstract writing never can. Stories can make explicit to us
the cultural contradictions, the cultural dialectic, into which we
are born or into which we are initiated, thereby allowing these
tensions or contradictions to gnaw at us, urging or challenging us
to resolve them. Nonetheless, I doubt that narrative alone, stories
alone, can resolve the contradictions with which our culture saddles us. Stories may present these matters to our attention or our
consciousness, but something else must follow.
There is a sense in which such cultural contradictions are
never resolved: they never can be and they never should be. To
resolve them would take the dynamic tension out of one's culture
and leave it flaccid, deadened, spent. But we are always in the
process, nonetheless, of working them out, of pursuing them to
the next cultural balance, and then to the next crisis, and so
forth. As Michael Oakeshott puts it:
Politics is the activity of attending to the general arrangements
of a collection of people who, in respect of their common
recognition of a manner of attending to its arrangements, compose a single community ....
This activity, then, springs neither from instant desires, nor from general principles, but from
the existing traditions of behaviour themselves. And the form it
takes, because it can take no other, is the amendment of existing arrangements by exploring and pursuing what is intimated
in them. The arrangements which constitute a society capable
of political activity, whether they are customs or institutions or
laws or diplomatic decisions, are at once coherent and incoherent; they compose a pattern and at the same time they intimate a sympathy for what does not fully appear. Political activity is the exploration of that sympathy; and consequently, relevant political reasoning will be the convincing exposure of a
sympathy, present but not yet followed up, and the convincing
demonstration that now is the appropriate moment for recognizing it.'
And while telling and studying narratives may be a necessary and
important part of this process of pursuing the intimations in one's
culture or ethic, .I cannot believe that it is the whole of it. Criticism must come sometime, and by my lights criticism is not narration. Stories are not enough.

50

MICHAEL OAKESHOTr, RATIONAuSM IN POLMCS 123-24 (1962).
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It seems to me that, in his own way, Shaffer realizes this, or
says as much, when he suggests (as he has in another forum 1 )
that law students ought not accept uncritically the stories told
them and the professional code offered them by their professional
elders.
From this Socratic point of view, the A.B.A. Report is a dismal
piece of attempted persuasion. Its section on training in professionalism in law school proposes that law teachers instill the
"principles of professionalism" in law students. The Report calls
for examinations and investigations, and for forcing law students to watch videotapes in which "experienced lawyers" discuss moral issues in a "Socratic" fashion.
Socrates would be appalled. None of that is education.
None of it is "professional." None of it is ethics. Ethics is talking together about morals. Socrates did not set his students
down and make them listen to him; he asked questions and
listened to them ....
questions principles.52

[E] thics does not instill principles. Ethics

I would not deny for a moment that a part of Socrates' power (or
perhaps it is Plato's) is his power of narration, his ability to tell a
telling story. But that is not the whole of his power, because after
telling a story (or after hearing a story told by one of his interlocutors), Socrates almost inevitably subjects it to criticism-to scrutiny, probing, questioning, and checking. This critical scrutiny seemingly never ends, because criticism-like narration, and unlike
theory--can incorporate or comprehend contradictions and proceeds by endlessly working out their tensions and implications.
Liberalism has its own stories, as does any culture or any
ethic, and as such, we need to examine these stories even as we
study the other, competing stories from other, competing cultures
and ethics. Given the history of Western civilization and .the central role liberalism plays and has played in it (which is not to deny
the equally central role played in Western civilization by the Aristotelian tradition), I do not think that it will repay us to reject the
liberal tradition out of hand. For all its perhaps misplaced emphasis on individualism, rights, autonomy, and choice, liberalism has
51 See Thomas L. Shaffer, Inaugural Howard Lichtenstein Lecture in Legal Ethics: Lauyer
Professionalism as a Moral Argument, 26 GONZ. L REv. 393 (1990/91).
52 Id. at 410 (emphases in original; footnotes omitted). Shaffer has incorporated
some of the material from this lecture into American Lauyers and Their Communities, but I
do not find this particular segment of the lecture reproduced in the book.
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proved to be an enduring inheritance, one that is importantly
implicated in whatever progress human beings have made on this
earth. The stories of liberalism are worth hearing and worth pursuing, as are the stories of its many competitors, be they in the
form of the ethic of the gentleman-lawyer or in the form of the
immigrant Italian-American or in yet another form or voice. s
Dismissing liberalism out of hand will not work and will not do.
Absorbing its insights and transforming them, even transcending
them, may. Only time and effort will tell.
V. AVALON ETHICS
Two years ago, in 1990, Barry Levinson gave us a movie called
Avalon,' in which he recalled and evoked the passage through
which his family went in becoming Americans. The movie takes
place in Baltimore from 1914 to, roughly, 1970 and is the story of
the Krichinsky family.
The opening scene is the arrival of Sam Krichinsky in America on the Fourth of July in 1914. The scene is repeated several
times throughout the movie, as in a reverie Sam recalls for the
benefit of himself and his listeners, usually younger members of
the Krichinsky family, what it was like to set foot in America. The
opening words of this scene become Sam's signature, the way he
thinks of himself and the way he identifies who he is and where
he is: "I came to America in 1914, by way of Philadelphia; that's
where I got off the boat. And then I came to Baltimore. It was
the most beautiful place you've ever seen in your life." When he
arrived in Baltimore on the Fourth of July, he didn't know what
holiday it was; and he came to think of the celebration of light
and life that he witnessed that night as a welcome for him. "What
a welcome it was; what a welcome." Sam walks through the streets
with the exploding fireworks, the brilliant sparklers, and the dancing people enveloping him in a festive atmosphere. Then, he finds
53 Sometimes Shaffer seems to suggest that he agrees with this rehabilitative view of
liberalism. Se, e.g., SHAFFER & SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 194. But at other places Shaffer
suggests that he rejects this view of liberalism. See, e.g., id. at 237 (speaking of H. Jefferson Powell, who helped Shaffer with this book, Shaffer says: "Powell ...
retains...
more respect for liberalism than Hauerwas and I have.").
54 AvALON (Tri-Star Pictures, Inc. 1990).
Only after submitting this review for publication did I learn that Tom Shaffer reviewed this movie in a column for the South Bend Tribune Thomas L. Shaffer, Levinson$r
"Avalon" cuts away when God joins the dinner table, S. BEND TRIB., Nov. 7, 1990, at A17.
(Copy on file with Notre Dame Law Review.) It is a searching and sensitive review which
I recommend to the reader.
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that his four brothers have moved from the address of the last
letter they sent him. A man who knows where his brothers now
live takes Sam to the right building, which has its name emblazoned above its door: "Avalon." The man calls up to the second
or third story windows, "Krichinsky," and out pop the four smiling,
expectant faces of Sam's brothers. Sam is home.
The remainder of the film works out the story of Sam's family, mostly through his life and his wife's life and the lives of their
son (Jules) and grandson (Michael), but also paying some attention to the lives of Sam's brothers, their wives, their children, and
grandchildren. Because the Krichinsky family is that, a family, with
all of its extensions, contentions, joys, and sorrows: what affects
one affects the others.
By the end of the film, Sam's wife has died, and Sam has
moved out of Jules' house and into a nursing home. The final
scene is Michael taking his son, Sam, to see Sam, the patriarch of
the family. Great-grandfather meets great-grandson and namesake.
The elder says that he visited Avalon, the old neighborhood, a few
weeks ago, and it was gone, eveiything had been removed for
urban renewal. The same was true, he discovered as he traveled
around Baltimore, for his wife's old neighborhood, and for other
of his old stomping grounds. Nothing was the same. "For a moment, I thought I never was." Then he says, "If I knew things
would no longer be, I would have died to have remembered it
better." Michael tells Sam, "I miss you." Michael and his son leave
Sam in the nursing home and walk hand-in-hand down its front
steps, where the great-grandson turns to his father and says, "Daddy, that man talks funny."
In its depiction of a family growing together and drifting
apart, of a family and a culture discovering and losing itself, a
country growing and receding, Avalon seems to me to capture an
essential dynamic in American life. We find ourselves only to lose
ourselves; and then we once more go through the quest of finding
ourselves again. Sam Krichinsky's life and the lives of his family
enact what I want to call "the ethics of immigrancy." Such an
ethic has two sides to it, only one of which I find to be fully acknowledged in Shaffer's book. One side of an ethic of immigrancy
is the fact of human belonging: We all come from somewhere. We
start from there. So far, and so stated, Shaffer and I agree. But
where are we headed?
The other side of an ethic of immigrancy is the fact that we
humans are always on a quest or a journey, and consequently, we
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are always in the midst of leaving as well as arriving. Shakespeare
put it well: "Men must endure/Their going hence even as their
coming hither;/Ripeness is all.""5 What enables us to endure our
journeying is partly our critical skills and self-possession, those
things that we may originally gain from one ethic or culture but
which are transportable and which may come to be planted and
bear fruit in a quite different ethic or culture. Immigrancy implies
both that we come from somewhere else and that we have the
capacity to project ourselves into new and different contexts or
cultures. Criticism of one's inherited ethic or culture (old and
new) is what I believe gives us the ability or capacity to sustain
such dislocation and relocation.
Does our immigrancy ever end, ever stop? I do not think so.
In this I find a different emphasis than the one stated and struck
in Shaffer's American Lawyers and Their Communities. Any ethos of
belonging must necessarily imply its counterpart: An ethos of
questing or journeying, of leaving the place where one has come
from and finding a new place to belong. It is not clear to me
either how this transition is managed or how we are to understand the tensions between the old and new cultures or communities. Yet it is in our ability to go through both processes-finding
and losing, celebrating and mourning-while remaining human, or
finding our humanity, in which I place my hope. In this, I suspect, Shaffer and I are brothers. We may not be of one and the
same mind on things, but we are of the same family.

55 WiLuIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING LEAR act 5, sc. 2. This quotation is one of the two
mottoes used by F.O. Matthiessen for his classic study of American literary immigrancy
and questing-American Renaissance-and Matthiessen tells his readers that this same quotation was marked by Melville in his copy of King Lear. F.O. MATrHIESSEN, AMERICAN
RENAISSANCE vi (1941).

